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On January 1, 2022, mandatory genetically engineered (GE) food disclosure labeling will
be required nationwide in the United States. To date, the only mandatory GE labeling law
implemented in the U.S. was Act 120 in Vermont. This thesis examines the consumer purchasing
response to the implementation of Vermont Act 120 using store-level scanner data of food
purchases. I measure the effects of Vermont Act 120 on the grocery store sales of non-GMO,
organic, and GE- labeled products in Vermont. Using a difference-in-difference approach, I can
compare stores in Vermont to control states before and after the law was passed, implemented,
and repealed. I find that during the implementation period, sales of non-GMO and organic
labeled products increased, and the sales of GE-labeled products decreased. The sales trend
reverted after the law was repealed but not quite to the baseline levels for organic and GElabeled products.

The analysis, findings, and conclusions expressed in this report should not be attributed to IRI

iii

DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to my parents for their resilience and constant support.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thank you to members of my committee for their patience and dedication to my thesis.
Dr. Linlin Fan deserves special recognition, for consistently encouraging me to go deeper with
my research and helping push me across the finish line.
The Agricultural Economics Department is the best department at Mississippi State and is
made up of wonderful professors and staff who care deeply for their student’s success. I have
been blessed to be a part of the department for both my undergraduate and graduate studies and
cannot thank everyone enough for their support and guidance over the years. Dr. Steve Turner,
thank you for getting me into agricultural economics through your SEC Football class and highly
encouraging me to pursue graduate school. Dr. Keith Coble, thank you for deepening my love of
agricultural policy and fun, political discussions. Ms. Debra Price and Ms. Frances Walker, thank
you for your companionship, chocolate breaks, and keeping the Ag Econ Department running
like clockwork!
Finishing this thesis during a global pandemic was an unexpected hurdle. Thank you to
Madeline Poss, my social distancing office buddy, for keeping me accountable. Thank you to my
friends Ben Mackin and Bailey Archey for keeping me sane on our long, winding walks through
Starkville. And, while she cannot read, thank you to the best dog in the world, Sally, who
provided the best companionship and unconditional love throughout graduate school.
Lastly, I must thank my family. Dad, thank you for introducing me to Mississippi and
teaching me grit. Mom, thank you for instilling me a love of knowledge and teaching me to face
iii

obstacles with humor and grace. Tori, thank you for being my sounding board and motivator.
Grandma Betty, thank you for your phone calls, perspective, and encouragement. I am honored
to be named after you and to carry on the Anders family legacy in agriculture.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... viii
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................1

II.

BACKGROUND ...............................................................................................................4
Genetic engineering ...........................................................................................................4
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard ........................................................12

III.

LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................14
Labeling theory ................................................................................................................14
GE labeling debate ..........................................................................................................15
Response to Vermont law ................................................................................................17

IV.

DATA AND METHODS ................................................................................................19
Data 19
Product category selection .........................................................................................20
Control state selection ...............................................................................................23
Summary Statistics ....................................................................................................25
Treatment effect without controls .......................................................................27
Similarity of treated and untreated stores ............................................................28
Differences in differences estimation ..............................................................................31
Empirical Specifications ............................................................................................33

V.

RESULTS ........................................................................................................................35
Main analysis ...................................................................................................................35
Investigating Heterogeneity.......................................................................................43
External Validity .......................................................................................................47
v

Robustness Tests .......................................................................................................49
Synthetic control method ...........................................................................................50
VI.

CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................56

REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................59
APPENDIX
A.

ROBUSTNESS TEST .....................................................................................................64

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1

Means of treated and control product categories ........................................................26

Table 4.2

Testing similiarities in treated and control stores in the “pre” period ........................30

Table 5.1

Difference-in-differences regression for log of quantity sold of non-GMO
labeled products ..........................................................................................................38

Table 5.2

Difference-in-differences regression for log of quantity sold of organic
labeled products ..........................................................................................................39

Table 5.3

Difference-in-differences regression of log of quantity sold of GE
Campbell’s Soup ........................................................................................................40

Table 5.4

Comparing average treatment effects relative to the preceding time period ..............41

Table 5.5

Price regressions .........................................................................................................42

Table 5.6

Comparing soup-buyers to non-soup buyers in Vermont and nationally ...................47

Table 5.7

Synthetic control estimates of average treatment effects of GE labeling policy
changes on food sales .................................................................................................53

Table A.1 Difference-in-differences regression for log of quantity sold including
income and education variables..................................................................................65
Table A.2 Difference-in-differences regression for log of quantity sold with the addition
of a UPC count variable .............................................................................................66
Table A.3 Difference-in-differences regression for log of quantity, only including
products sold in each state in every week ..................................................................67
Table A.4 Difference-in-differences for log of quantity of GE Campbell’s Soup,
including temperature .................................................................................................68

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 Google searches for “GMO” in Vermont and the United States ................................11
Figure 2.2 Google searches for “GMO” in Vermont, Oregon, and Washington .........................12
Figure 2.3 USDA approved National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard symbols .........13
Figure 4.1 Average quantity of organic and non-GMO labeled products sold by week
and state ......................................................................................................................24
Figure 4.2 Average quantity of GE Campbell’s Soup products sold by week and state .............25
Figure 4.3 Parallel trend assumption ...........................................................................................32
Figure 5.1 The impact of Act 120 on quantities sold of non-GMO products across
income and education distributions in Vermont .........................................................45
Figure 5.2 The impact of Act 120 on quantities sold of organic products across
education and income distributions in Vermont .........................................................45
Figure 5.3 The impact of Act 120 on quantities sold of GE Campbell’s Soup across
education and income distributions in Vermont .........................................................46
Figure 5.4 Aggregate volume sold for organic and non-GMO foods per grocery store per
4-week period .............................................................................................................54
Figure 5.5 Aggregate volume sold for GE Campbell’s Soup per grocery store per week ..........55

viii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 2022, mandatory genetically engineered (GE) food disclosure labeling will
be fully required nationwide in the United States on foods produced with GE ingredients1. To
date, the only mandatory GE labeling law implemented in the U.S. has been Vermont Act 120,
which required foods with GE ingredients sold in Vermont be labeled with a GE disclosure
statement on the package.
The law was implemented for the month of July 2016 before being preempted by the
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard (NBFDS). In this research I study the
consumer purchasing response to the initial implementation of mandatory GE labeling in
Vermont using store-level scanner data of food purchases. Using Vermont Act 120 as a natural
experiment, I measure the effects of the GE labeling law on the quantities sold of Non-GMO
(GMO - Genetically Modified Organism, equivalent to GE), Organic, and GE- labeled products
in Vermont grocery stores compared to comparable control states using difference-in-differences
for the main analysis and synthetic control method as a primary robustness check.
While the implementation of the law was unique to Vermont and rife with complications,
I will attempt to control for these complications in several ways. Once Vermont Act 120 was

1

The National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard will require foods with over 5% bioengineered (BE)
ingredients to labeled. While GE and BE are different terms, to date the list of approved bioengineered crops listed
by the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service are the same as the GE crops approved for production in the United
States.

1

passed in May 2014, the law met immediate opposition from the food industry, which feared a
state-by-state patchwork of labeling requirements would affect their ability to distribute food
nationally. This led to efforts in Congress to pass a law preempting Vermont Act 120. While
these efforts failed to preempt the initial July 2016 implementation of the law, there was a sense
that Congress would eventually preempt the law, which they did by the end of July by passing
the NBFDS. Additionally, there was a six-month grace period for foods without a GE label
produced prior to July 1, 2016 and a one-year grace period before lawsuits could be brought
against manufacturers for non-compliance (O’Gorman 2016). In anticipation of Vermont Act
120 being overturned and the grace periods, many food companies were apprehensive to begin
labeling in Vermont, creating a fundamental empirical challenge. Therefore, we are unable to
definitively conclude whether each product was or was not correctly labeled during the month
the policy was in place. I account for this ambiguity by focusing on products that were most
likely to be labeled: non-GMO labeled products, organic labeled products, and GE labeled
Campbell’s soup.
Overall, food manufactures feared consumers would decrease purchases of GE labeled
products, due to mistrust and confusion over genetic engineering, and increased food costs (Van
Eenennaam, Chassy, and Kalaitzandonakes 2014). Although there is no scientific evidence that
GE foods are unsafe for human consumption (National Academies of Science, Engineering, and
Medicine 2016), food manufacturers were concerned that GE labels could potentially signal to
consumers that the product was inferior. A 2018 Pew Research Center survey found that 49% of
Americans believe that foods with GE ingredients are worse for one’s health than non-GE foods,
an increase of 10 percentage points from the same survey question compared to 2016 (Funk and
Kennedy 2016; Funk, Kennedy, and Hefferon 2018).
2

I find that the implementation of Vermont’s GE labeling law led to increases in sales of
non-GMO and organic labeled products and decreases in sales of GE labeled soups during the
month it was implemented. Sales reverted back towards the baseline for all three product
categories after Vermont Act 120 was preempted, but remained above the baseline for organic
products, below the baseline for GE labeled soups, and fell below the baseline for non-GMO
labeled products.
This thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. To the best of my knowledge, this
is the first study to analyze the impact of mandatory GE labeling on the purchasing decisions of
consumers using store-level scanner data and a multi-year framework. This is also the first study
to investigate the impact of mandatory GE labeling on the sales of substitute products, i.e. nonGMO and organic labeled foods in a real-world context. While the Vermont GE labeling
implementation was imperfect and differs from the NBFDS in a number of ways, this research
will help inform industry groups on what to expect from consumers at the grocery store as
NBFDS goes into effect and is relevant for policy makers who are curious about the impact of
mandatory GE labeling on food sales.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
Genetic engineering
The National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (2016) define genetic
engineering as, “a process by which humans introduce or change DNA, RNA, or proteins in an
organism to express a new trait or change the expression of an existing trait.” Genetically
Engineered foods, often referred to as Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO’s) by the public,
were first utilized commercially in the mid-1990’s. There are ten GE crops in commercial
production in the United States: corn, soybeans, cotton, potatoes, papayas, squash, canola,
alfalfa, apples and sugar beets (ISAAA, 2018). Ingredients from corn, soybeans, cotton, sugar
beets, and canola are particularly common in processed foods available in U.S. grocery stores2.
In addition to the ten GE crops in commercial production in the United States, the Agricultural
Marketing Service (AMS) includes eggplant, pink fleshed pineapple, and AquAdvantage Salmon
on its List of Bioengineered Foods available worldwide (USDA AMS, 2018). Bioengineered
foods are defined by the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard as those that,
“contain detectable genetic material that has been modified through certain lab techniques and
cannot be created through conventional breeding or found in nature” (National Bioengineered
Food Disclosure Standard, 2018). While these definitions are somewhat ambiguous, the current

2

Ingredients derived from these crops are wide-ranging. Examples include many forms of oils, sweeteners,
thickeners, starches, and more.
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AMS bioengineered foods list includes all genetically engineered foods listed by ISAAA, the
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications.
Genetic Engineering is used to add desirable traits to crops such as herbicide-tolerance,
insect-resistance (e.g., Bt Bacterium), or enhanced nutritional benefits (NASEM, 2016). Genetic
Engineering has been found to increase the world supply of corn, cotton, and soybeans, reduce
food prices, and reduce land conversion, preventing increases in greenhouse gas emissions
(Barrows, Sexton, and Zilberman 2014; Taheripour, Mahaffey, and Tyner 2016; Lusk, Tack, and
Hendricks 2017; Scheitrum, Schaefer, and Nes 2020). Switching from non-Bt to Bt crops
specifically has led to decreases in synthetic insecticide use and higher insect biodiversity
(NASEM, 2016).
Despite scientific consensus on the safety of GMOs, many consumers remain skeptical. A
2018 survey by the Pew Research Center found that 49% of Americans believe that foods with
GE ingredients are worse for one’s health than non-GE foods, 44% believe they are neither better
nor worse, and 5% say GE ingredients are better for one’s health than non-GE foods (Funk,
Kennedy, and Hefferon 2018). This represents a 10% increase from 2016, when 39% of
Americans believed that foods with GE ingredients were worse for one’s health than non-GE
foods (Funk and Kennedy 2016).
Arguments against GE foods tend to focus on the potential consequences on human
health and the environment. The Non-GMO Project, which designates the Non-GMO Project
Verified Label, cites the increased use of the herbicide glyphosate, emergence of herbicide and
pesticide resistant weeds and pests, concerns over farmer sovereignty due to patented GE seeds,
and lack of epidemiological studies on health impacts as reasons to avoid GE foods. Vermont
Law 120 also cited concerns in the law’s preamble over the effects on biodiversity, cross5

pollination with native plants, and religious and moral objections as reasons people avoid GE
foods.
However, some of these arguments have been rejected by the scientific community. In
2016, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) issued
Genetically Engineered Crops: Experiences and Prospects, reviewing over 900 studies that
spanned 20 years. The report found no substantiated evidence of risk to human health from
consumption of GE crops nor overall did the committee find “conclusive evidence of cause-andeffect relationships between GE crops and environmental problems” (NASEM, 2016, p. 15).
They qualify this environmental claim by saying, “However, the complex nature of assessing
long-term environmental changes often made it difficult to reach definitive conclusions.”
Additionally, the report found that GE crops have had generally positive economic outcomes for
producers.
Vermont labeling law history and implementation
On May 8th, 2014, Vermont became the first state in the nation to pass a law requiring
mandatory GE labeling for foods produced with genetically engineered ingredients when
Vermont Act 120 was signed into law (H.122 (Act 120) - "An Act Relating to the Labeling of
Food Produced with Genetic Engineering"). Specifically, the law required foods made with over
0.9% genetically engineered ingredients by weight to be labeled with a GE disclosure statement
by July 1, 2016. Exceptions for restaurants, unpackaged foods intended for immediate
consumption, liquor, products produced with GE processing aids or enzymes, meat, poultry, and
dairy products meant that consumer packaged goods were the foods that would predominantly be
affected. Although Vermont was the first state to succeed in passing mandatory labeling, many
others had tried unsuccessfully.
6

Between 2012 and 2014, state-wide referendums were held on mandatory GMO labeling
in California, Washington, Colorado, and Oregon. Each referendum failed, by 2.8%, 2.2%, 31%,
and 0.06% respectively (California Secretary of State 2012; Washington Secretary of State 2013;
Colorado Secretary of State 2014; Oregon Secretary of State 2014). Oregon’s Measure 92
initiative failed by only 837 votes out of 1,506,311 cast. In 2013 and early 2014, Connecticut and
Maine passed mandatory GE labeling laws that would not go into effect unless multiple
surrounding states passed similar law (Wilson 2014). In the 2016 legislative sessions alone, there
were over 70 bills addressing GE labeling nationwide (Farquhar 2016).
Once Vermont Act 120 was passed in May 2014, the law met immediate opposition from
the food industry, which feared a state-by-state patchwork of differing labeling requirements
would affect their ability to distribute food nationally. They also feared consumers would
decrease purchases of GE labeled products. The pushback included a lawsuit against Vermont by
the Grocery Manufacturer’s Association, Snack Food Association, International Dairy Foods
Association, and the National Association of Manufacturers. In April of 2015, the GMA’s
request for a preliminary injunction preventing the implementation of the law was rejected in
federal district court, but the lawsuit was allowed to proceed (Wyant 2015). The lawsuit was
eventually dismissed in August of 2016 after the Vermont labeling law was nullified by the
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard (National Law Review 2016).
In addition to the lawsuit, the food industry lobbied the U.S. Congress to pass a law
preventing the Vermont law from implementation. On March 16, 2016, the final attempt at
preempting Vermont Act 120 through The Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015 failed
procedural vote (Brasher 2016). This law would have outlawed states from establishing
mandatory GE labeling requirements and created voluntary national standards for non-GE and
7

GE disclosure labels. Recognizing the U.S. Congress would not act in time to block Vermont’s
mandatory GE labeling from implementation, numerous food companies, including General
Mills Inc., The Kellogg Co., Mars Inc., and more, announced plans to voluntarily implement GE
labeling nationally the following week after The Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015
failed. (Watrous 2016). Ahead of other companies, Campbell’s was the first major American
processed food and snack company to announce on January 8, 2016 its plans to label all GE
products.
Mandatory GE labeling went into effect in Vermont on July 1, 2016, which was
celebrated with a rally featuring Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin, then Democratic presidential
candidate Senator Bernie Sanders, Senator Patrick Leahy, and other Vermont leaders on the
statehouse steps (Gram 2016). The law going into effect was featured in widespread local news
coverage. While the implementation of GE labeling was celebrated by Vermont political leaders
and labeling activists, news reports also point to confusion from food retailers over the law
(Ledbetter 2016). For food manufacturers that did not announce nation-wide labeling schemes,
some chose to stop shipping to Vermont altogether or gave distributors stickers of GE disclosure
information to add to products individually (Tron 2016). Several articles noted that Price
Chopper, a major grocery chain in Vermont, had 3,000-3,500 products that would not be shipped
to Vermont as they were not labeling GE foods (Tron 2016; Chandler 2016). Other anecdotal
evidence suggests that some food items including Kosher food were becoming scarce
(D’Ambrosio 2016). Some argued that smaller, local stores were being more affected, as they
had less ability to pre-stock items no longer being shipped to Vermont (“GMO Labeling Takes
Effect in Vermont” 2016).

8

Though it appears that stores started to act during July, they were not forced to due to a
grace period. As part of the law, there was a six-month grace period for retailers to sell unlabeled
foods that had been previously packaged and distributed to retailers prior to July 1st, 2016, and a
one-year grace period before lawsuits could be brought against manufacturers for noncompliance (O’Gorman 2016). Liability for enforcement of this law resided with manufacturers,
who faced a fine of up to $1,000 per day, per product if unlabeled GE products are offered for
retail sale in Vermont. To not label their products, manufacturers were required to obtain sworn
statements from suppliers verifying that the ingredients were non-GE or have the food products
verified as non-GE or organic through qualifying organizations.
Part of the hesitation of national manufacturers to comply, was their belief that the
Vermont labeling law would still eventually be preempted by a federal law. Their estimate was
correct, as the bill that created the National Bioengineered (BE) Food Disclosure Standard
(NBFDS) was passed by the Senate on July 7th, the House of Representatives on July 14th, and
was signed by President Barack Obama on July 29th (S. 764). The NBFDS law nullified the
Vermont mandatory GE labeling law, putting labeling solely within federal jurisdiction. It also
mandated a nation-wide BE labeling program to be implemented, which will begin full
enforcement on January 1, 2022.
Although the roll-out of mandatory labeling in Vermont was arguably incomplete, and
amid a backdrop of probable federal interference, Vermonters were still aware of GMO labeling.
In addition to extensive local media coverage cited above, Google Trends Information evidence
suggests Vermonters were learning more about GMOs. Figure 2.1 compares the search interest
for the term “GMO” of people in Vermont and the entire United States, including Vermont, from

9

2013 – 20173. Google search interest is scored on a range of 0 – 100, with 100 being the highest
level of search interest for a word/phrase in each place during a given time. The graph shows that
Vermont consistently had higher interest in GMOs than the country as a whole and that
Vermonter’s interest peaked when Vermont Act 120 was passed and when mandatory labeling
was implemented. Figure 2.2 compares Vermont to this study’s main control states of
Washington and Oregon. It shows that while Vermont had a higher level of interest over the
course of the time period, Oregon and Washington did have periods of high interest
corresponding to each state’s respective GMO labeling ballot initiatives election date.

3

Google Search Trend data showed near identical results for the overall topic of “Genetically Modified Organisms”,
which accounts for other related searches, misspellings, and abbreviations. The terms “Genetically Engineered” and
“Bioengineered” did not have enough consistent search interest at the state level. The abbreviations “GE” and “BE”
are too general and are most associated with off-topic searches including “General Electric” and “How to be…” to
provide meaningful insight.
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Figure 2.1

Google searches for “GMO” in Vermont and the United States
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Figure 2.2

Google searches for “GMO” in Vermont, Oregon, and Washington

National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard
As discussed in the previous section, the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Law
was signed on July 29th, 2016. The law requires the USDA to create a national mandatory
bioengineered food disclosure standard. Foods from very small food manufacturers, restaurants,
or derived from animals that eat GE feed are excluded from the mandatory disclosure
requirement.
On December 20, 2018, the USDA announced the details of the National Bioengineered
Food Disclosure Standard as required by the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Law. The
12

new standard calls for all foods intended for human consumption with 5% or higher amounts of
traceable modified genetic material to be labeled. The food manufacturer can choose between an
on-package text disclosure statement (similar to the Vermont law’s GE disclosure statements),
USDA approved BE symbols, a QR code combined with a provided phone number for more
information, or a text message disclosure prompt for more information. The USDA approved BE
symbols are shown in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3

USDA approved National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard symbols

This mandatory labeling standard differs from Vermont’s mandatory labeling regulations
in three main ways. First, the federal law uses the term “Bioengineered” while Vermont’s law
used the term “Genetically Engineered” or “Genetically Modified” on its disclosures. Second,
they differ in ingredient levels requiring labeling. Vermont’s standard required a disclosure for
foods containing 0.9% or greater GE ingredients, while the federal standard is 5% or greater.
Lastly, the NBFDS allows for a variety of disclosure choices, including a QR code.

13

CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
Labeling theory
Food product labels convey a wide variety of attributes and can be either voluntary or
mandatory. At its most basic level, labeling provides information for the consumer to assist in
purchase decision making. Voluntary claims are primarily used for product differentiation to
signal attractive qualities that will command higher prices. The U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) oversees labeling for most U.S. food products. Mandatory labeling
requirements include nutrition labels, food allergen disclosure, quantity, and many other
formatting regulations. The FDA also regulates many voluntary labels such as nutrition and
health claims to ensure they meet certain specifications (FDA, 2013). Food labeling conflicts
between consumers, industry, and the government have been occurring in the U.S. for centuries
(Kolodinsky 2012).
Theoretically, both mandatory and voluntary labeling are implemented to combat
asymmetric information between consumers and food manufacturers. As complete information is
fundamental to efficient markets, government regulation can remedy market failure by assuring
this (Mirrlees 1974). Asymmetric information leading to uncertainty regarding product quality
will lead to lower demand, and possibly lead to exclusively low-quality products being supplied
(Akerlof 1970). Asymmetric information can be especially pertinent in the case of credence
attributes, qualities that cannot be determined by normal use, if viewed as undesirable and thus
14

left unlabeled by the producer (Darby and Karni 1973; Golan et al. 2001). The presence of GE
ingredients in food products is a credence attribute (Fulton and Giannakas 2004).
Credence attributes are important in modern food labeling/marketing and affect consumer
preferences (Fernqvist and Ekelund 2014). Examples include “process labels” which denote how
a product is grown or raised, such as organic, antibiotic-free, grass-fed, etc. These labels affirm
consumer’s values and are increasingly important (Kolodinsky 2012; Messer, Costanigro, and
Kaiser 2017). In addition, as today’s consumers are increasingly interested in wellness,
sustainability, and transparency in food products, and sales of various “clean label” market
segments are rising (The Nielsen Company, 2017)
GE labeling debate
There is a wide gap between consumer and producer acceptance of GE technologies.
Between 1995 and 2016, roughly the first 20 years of GE commercial crops, nearly one thousand
academic articles were published exploring consumer’s attitudes towards GE foods (Lusk,
McFadden, and Wilson 2018). Mandatory GE labeling proponents argued that it is a consumer’s
right to know if GE ingredients were present in food (Just Label It). The Just Label It campaign
listed over 700 partner organizations, primarily consisting of natural food brands and businesses.
It also included partners from consumer advocate, environmental, health, and select farm
organizations (Just Label it).
Opponents of GE labeling consisted primarily of biotechnology and food companies who
argued that mandatory labels would act as a warning sign for consumers, further confusing them
on the safety of GE products, and lead to potential increases in price of both GE and non-GE
foods. They argued that as there is scientific consensus on the safety of GE food, the benefits to

15

consumers “right-to-know” is based on scientific misunderstanding, and thus the benefits to
consumers do not outweigh the costs to producers (Sunstein 2017).
For those who believed GE labels would act as a warning, they hypothesized that the
labels disclosing the inclusion of GE ingredients would cause a signaling effect, potentially
influencing individual preferences away from GE products. A new emerging view finds that
implementation of mandatory GE labels may actually have the opposite signaling effect by
bolstering consumer trust and lowering perceived risk (Costa-Font and Mossialos 2005;
Kolodinsky, Morris, and Pazuniak 2018; Kolodinsky and Lusk 2018).
Empirical evidence for GE labels as information tools include Costanigro and Lusk
(2014), who use controlled experiments to find that the willingness-to-pay (WTP) to avoid GE
foods was higher in the presence of mandatory “contains” labels than with voluntary “does not
contain” labels. In a Canadian mock grocery store lab experiment using eye tracking technology,
Baynham (2018) finds that while the presence of non-GE labels increases purchases for non-GE
products, the presence of GE labels does not affect the likelihood of purchases of granola bars
including GE ingredients.
Lusk and Rozan (2008) use a mail survey and find that respondents who believe a
mandatory labelling law is already in place by the U.S. federal government are more likely to
believe GE food is unsafe. Studying another form of biotechnology that faces a significant
backlash when introduced into the marketplace, Kanter, Messer, and Kaiser (2009) provide
experimental evidence that the presence of non-rBST and organic milk choices lead to lower
WTP for conventional milk. In a meta-analysis of WTP for GE foods, Lusk et al. (2005) found
that overall WTP for non-GE foods was approximately 26% higher than GE foods.
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Arguments around pricing centered on what would occur to food prices if companies
switched to more expensive, non-GMO ingredients. On the retailer and producer side, mandatory
GE labels have been demonstrated to change the products available in the marketplace. In
response to the 2016 Vermont law implementation, Carter and Schaefer (2019) find food
manufacturers substitute GE beet sugar for non-GE cane sugar. The substitution and
reformulation results in a 13% price discount for GE beet sugar and a 1% price premium for nonGE cane sugar. Gruère, Carter, and Farzin (2008) compare mandatory and voluntary labeling
systems in the EU and Canada. They find that in countries with high distrust of genetic
engineering, mandatory labeling leads to a reduction of consumer choice as food manufacturers
chose to reformulate to non-GE ingredients. An empirical analysis of the food prices of non-GE,
organic, and conventional (GE) foods finds that between 2009-2016, price premiums for select
processed food categories for non-GE foods ranged from 9.8% - 61.8% and between 13.8% 91% for organic (Kalaitzandonakes, Lusk, and Magnier 2018). Thus, if food manufacturers
switched from producing GE to more non-GE and organic products, food prices would likely
rise.
Response to Vermont law
The most pertinent studies to my research examine the effects of Vermont’s brief
implementation of mandatory GE labels on consumers. Kolodinsky and Lusk (2018) find that the
labeling policy leads to a 19% reduction in opposition to GE foods. They used nationally
representative survey data and a difference-in-difference (DiD) method (Vermonters as treatment
and respondents in the rest of the U.S. as control) for their analysis. The authors did not
distinguish whether the improved attitudes towards GE products are the result of labels
improving a sense of control, trust, or operating by some other mechanisms.
17

Also using surveys, Kolodinsky, Morris and Pazuniak (2018) analyze what type of
consumers notice the mandatory GE labels in Vermont and how the labels affect self-reported
consumer behavior. They find that approximately one-third of respondents report seeing a
“produced with genetic engineering” or “partially produced with genetic engineering” label. Of
those who do notice the label, slightly over one-half use the label as an informational cue to
make a decision on previously held beliefs. In contrast, 12.8% of those who see the label, or 4%
of total respondents, indicated the labels act as a signal that affect preferences and purchases.
A recent master’s thesis examined the short term effect of mandatory labeling in Vermont
using IRI scanner data at the week-product-state level and a triple difference approach
comparing non-GE and GE breakfast foods in Vermont and Oregon (Pazuniak 2018). Pazuniak
found that there were no significant short-term effects on the prices or quantity sold of GE or
non-GE products in Vermont after labeling was implemented. Importantly, this study’s non-GE
category consisted of completely unlabeled products, without non-GMO or organic labels.
Additionally, as Vermont Act 120 was not fully enforced due to grace periods, it is unclear if
Pazuniak’ s GE product sample definitively had a GE disclosure label. Overall, my study differs
from Pazuniak’s work in three aspects: (1) I focus on products we know with more certainty
were labeled during the implementation period, i.e. Campbell soups, to obtain the impact of
Vermont Act 120 on the sales of GE labeled products, (2) because Non-GMO and Organic
labeled foods are substitutes of GE versions of the foods, I study the impact of Vermont Act 120
on a wider variety of non-GMO and organic labeled products (3) I use a longer time frame to
analyze separately the impact of Vermont Act 120’s passage, initial implementation, and repeal
on the sales of GE, non-GMO, and organic labeled food items
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CHAPTER IV
DATA AND METHODS
Data
For this study, I use IRI InfoScan which provides weekly sales records with Universal
Product Code (UPC) or barcode level product information at major regional and national chain
stores. A UPC is a unique product identifier. One product such as GE Campbell Soup has around
200 UPC IDs because there are different flavors or sizes of Campbell soup and each flavor-size
combination (for example) has a unique UPC ID. The final dataset I use in the main analysis is
restricted to stores in Vermont, Washington, and Oregon and includes 54,234 store-weeks, 1,301
unique non-GMO labeled UPCs, 4,858 unique organic labeled UPCs and 283 unique GE-labeled
Campbell’s soup UPCs. An observation consists of the units sold of a specific item (UPC) over
one week at one store. I also use IRI HomeScan, which includes barcode-level weekly food
purchases for sample households and household characteristics. HomeScan is used to analyze
who purchases GE Campbell’s soup in Vermont and the nation and to shed light on the
generalizability of the results to customers outside Vermont and non-soup buyers. To mitigate
the complexities associated with entries and exits of stores, this analysis only includes those that
remain open every year. Furthermore, only mass merchandisers and grocery stores are
incorporated in the study because those stores take up the vast majority of grocery sales in the
respective states.
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Product category selection
I study three main product categories: non-GMO labeled products, organic labeled
products, and GE-labeled Campbell’s Soup. Non-GMO and organic labeled products were
chosen as categories of interest because they are natural substitutes to GE products. Organic
products as certified by the USDA cannot include GE ingredients. As there was a lot of
confusion over the rollout of GE labeling in Vermont, if consumers sought to definitively avoid
GE ingredients, non-GMO and organic labeled foods offered a clear option.
The organic_claim and gmo_claim variables provide information on which UPCs are
labeled as organic and non-GMO. Of the 32,002 total observations (upc-year combinations) with
some sort of organic labels, 96.6% have the “USDA/CERTIFIED ORGANIC” and 3.4% have
the “100% ORGANIC” claim. Of the 2,429 total observations with some kind of non-GMO
labels, 48.6% were claimed “NO GMO”, 48.3% claimed “NON GMO PROJECT VERIFIED”,
and 3.0% claimed “NOT TREATED WITH GMOS”. The non-GMO and organic products
represent a wide range of packaged food items including frozen meals, baby food, juices, dairy
products, snack foods, and more. Random weight products, those that you must weigh at check
out and primarily consist of fresh fruits and vegetables, are not included in this study.
As it is impossible to know definitively what products were labeled with a GE disclosure
statement, when they were labeled, and where they were available, it is a much more difficult
decision to select which GE labeled product to study. On January 7, 2016, Campbell Soup
became the first major food company to announce intentions of labeling all products with a GE
disclosure statement nationwide (Strom 2016). They had previously disclosed GE ingredients
starting in 2015 on their website, whatsinmyfood.com. In their press statement, Campbell
declared their support for federal regulation of GE labeling, citing a consumer-first mindset and
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that 92% of consumers supported mandatory labeling. While supporting federal regulation, they
still opposed a state-by-state approach, which may boost manufacturing costs and increase
confusion among consumers. There are no data about whether the rest of the country, or my
control states, i.e. Washington and Oregon, had GE labeled products after Vermont Act 120 was
initially implemented. The implementation of mandatory GE labeling in Vermont was not fully
enforced on July 1, 2016 and the state granted grace periods to retailers and manufacturers.
However, we choose to study Campbell Soup because we know with more certainty that this
product was labeled during the implementation period. In addition, our estimated impact of
Vermont Act 120 on the sales of GE labeled Campbell’s soup also captures the increase in
Vermont's consumer awareness of mandatory GE labeling during the implementation period. In
other words, I assume that Vermonters are more aware of the mandatory GE labeling law/Act
120 compared to consumers in Washington and Oregon. This assumption is consistent with
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 which show google searches for “GMO” in Vermont are much higher
than those in Washington and Oregon during the study period.
Other major food companies including General Mills, Mars, ConAgra, and Kellogg’s did
not announce their decisions to start labeling their products with GE disclosure statements until
the second half of the March of 2016, after the Senate’s attempts at a national labeling law failed.
Store visits suggest that despite the announcement in March, ConAgra and Kellogg’s did not
label products with GE ingredients as of November 2018. General Mill’s, which has a broad
variety of product categories, does not seem to consistently label all their products with GE
ingredients.
The main identifying assumption for the DiD model is the parallel trends assumption.
This assumption implies that absent any treatment, the sales for the treated and control states
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must have similar trajectories before and after the treatment/policy change took place. I
graphically test for parallel trends in the sales of Mars candies, Mars M&Ms, and Campbell
owned Pepperidge Farm cookies before Vermont Act 120. They do not exhibit reliable parallel
pre-existing trends or parallel trends even after controlling for various store characteristics and
fixed effects and thus do not serve as good candidates for a different-in-difference framework. In
contrast, Campbell’s soup shows relatively stable parallel pre-existing trends which indicates that
Vermonters were likely to show similar trends of purchase behaviors as consumers in
Washington and Oregon absent mandatory GE labeling. I specifically chose Campbell’s soup as
it is the most iconic of the Campbell’s products. Campbell’s is an American processed food
company that includes brands like Campbell’s, V8, Goldfish, Pepperidge Farm. Although media
coverage of Campbell’s decision to label all their brands containing GE ingredients was
prevalent in Vermont, consumers may not be aware that brands such as V8 and Goldfish also
belong to Campbell’s. Therefore, I choose Campbell’s soup to diminish the uncertainties around
brand recognition and increase the probability that Vermonters know Campbell’s soup with GE
ingredients is labeled after Act 120.
The panel for non-GMO and organic categories begins December 31, 2012 and ends
December 31, 2017, which includes the dates of the signing of Vermont Act 120 (May 8, 2014),
implementation of Vermont Act 120 (July 1, 2016), and signing of NBFDS which preempted
Vermont Act 120 (July 29, 2016). As shown in Figure 4.1, the analysis for the non-GMO and
organic panel uses four periods: a pre-period (from Dec. 31, 2012 to April 27, 2014), an Act 120
passage period (from May 5, 2014 to June 26, 2016), a labeling period (from July 4 to July 31,
2016) and a post-labeling period (from August 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2017). I limit the panel for
Campbell’s soup to the timeframe that has more certainty regarding the GE labeling of the
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product. The timeframe of the analysis over GE soup is restricted to the period from May 23,
2016 to September 11th, 2016. As shown in Figure 4.2, the analysis for the GE Campbell Soup
panel uses three periods: a pre-period (from May 23 to June 26, 2016), a labeling period (from
July 4 to July 31, 2016) and a post-labeling period (from August 1 to September 11, 2016).
Control state selection
For my main analysis, Vermont stores are compared to stores from Washington and
Oregon. These two states were selected for several reasons. First, Washington and Oregon both
had extremely close state-wide GE labeling ballot initiatives in 2013 and 2014, respectively. GE
labeling was defeated in Washington by 2.18% of the vote and in Oregon by 0.06%, showing
that a large portion of the population supported mandatory GE labeling. Second, both states are
like Vermont in political ideology. In a 2014 Pew Research Center survey, each state had 30% of
respondents identify as conservative, 32-34% identify as moderate, 30-35% identify as liberal,
and 5-7% identify as not knowing (2014 Religious Landscape Study). Each state was also
represented by exclusively Democratic or Democratic-leaning independent U.S. Senators and
Governors throughout the timeframe of this study. Third, they all share a somewhat similar
geography. Each is a northern, coastal, and mountainous state. Finally, while neighboring states
may have been a better demographic and cultural fit, they are in the same labeling and media
markets as Vermont. In addition, as Vermont is a small state, it is feasible that Vermont residents
could cross state lines to grocery shop. I also check the robustness of the results using
Northeastern states in the synthetic control method, and the results are consistent.
As an identification test for the difference-in-difference method, I look at sales data
graphically to confirm parallel trends between the treated and control states. Figure 4.1 and
Figure 4.2 show that the quantity sold by week throughout the respective time frames for each
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product category. These figures show that there are no major differences in trends between
Vermont and the control states. Based on this graphical analysis, I use WA and OR as control
states. Additionally, store-fixed effects will control for all possible time-invariant determinants
of demand for the different locations.

Figure 4.1

Average quantity of organic and non-GMO labeled products sold by week and
state
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Figure 4.2

Average quantity of GE Campbell’s Soup products sold by week and state

Summary Statistics
Table 4.1 consists of summary statistics for the three product categories divided between
the control stores from Washington and Oregon, and the treated stores from Vermont, and by
time period. As the GE Soup analysis is done on a shorter time frame that does not span the date
when Vermont Act 120 was passed, time periods for the GE Campbell Soup products only
include the pre-period, the mandatory labeling period, and the post-labeling period. However, in
the GE Campbell Soup analysis the pre-period corresponds to roughly a month before the
labeling period begins. Included in the table are the means for logged quantity of units sold per
UPC-store-week, unit price, total number of stores, and unique UPCs per group.
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Table 4.1

Means of treated and control product categories
Organic
Period

Pre-Period

Variable
Log(Q)
Unit Price

Act 120

Number of Stores
Number of UPC IDS
Log(Q)
Unit Price

Labeling

Number of Stores
Number of UPC IDS
Log(Q)
Unit Price
Number of Stores
Number of UPC IDS

Postlabel

Log(Q)
Unit Price
Number of Stores
Number of UPC IDS

Non-GMO

GE Campbell’s® Soup

Control
Stores
0.98
(0.89)
3.39
(2.31)
152
1,807
0.94
(0.86)
3.70
(2.82)
151
2,427
0.91
(0.85)
3.77
(2.98)
144
1,995

Treated
Stores
1.14
(0.98)
3.71
(2.15)
55
2,510
1.11
(0.97)
3.88
(2.25)
55
2,833
1.11
(0.97)
4.02
(2.35)
54
2,056

Control
Stores
0.95
(0.87)
4.87
(4.09)
152
216
0.89
(0.83)
5.02
(4.98)
151
547
0.85
(0.80)
4.90
(5.07)
143
474

Treated
Stores
1.10
(0.93)
4.55
(2.70)
55
292
1.06
(0.91)
4.33
(2.73)
55
579
1.02
(0.88)
4.05
(2.83)
54
531

Control
Stores
0.81
(0.80)
2.25
(0.67)
152
210

Treated
Stores
0.97
(0.83)
2.04
(0.68)
56
204

0.83
(0.81)
2.22
(0.65)
154
213

0.93
(0.83)
2.06
(0.65)
56
205

0.91
(0.84)
3.75
(2.91)
143
2,720

1.09
(0.95)
4.03
(2.28)
54
2,517

0.89
(0.81)
4.91
(5.40)
143
871

1.00
(0.90)
4.08
(2.94)
54
916

1.01
(0.80)
2.12
(0.68)
152
233

1.04
(0.87)
2.07
(0.66)
56
206

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The pre-period, Act 120, labeling and postlabel period correspond to Jan. 2013 – April 27, 2014,
May 5, 2014 – June 26, 2016, July 4 – July 31, 2016 and August 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2017 for the non-GMO and organic categories, respectively.
For GE Campbell’s Soup, the pre-period, labeling and postlabel periods are May 23 – June 26, 2016, July 4 – July 31, 2016 and August 1 – Sept.
11, 2016. Weeks split by policy implementation are dropped.
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Treatment effect without controls
Table 4.1 includes the means of average quantities sold per upc-store-week as well as
average unit price, total number of stores, and total number of unique UPCs sold during each
period.
Notably, Table 4.1 allows one to calculate preliminary estimates of the treatment effects
of GE labeling policies on an outcome variable of interest (e.g., quantity sold, price) based on a
DiD approach. This can be done by subtracting the difference in an outcome variable between
the post- and the pre-treatment period for the stores in the control states (WA, OR) from the
difference in an outcome variable between the post- and the pre-treatment period for the stores in
the treated states (VT). Compared to their immediate previous period, the sales of both organic
and non-GMO products rose or stayed the same when the law was passed (Act 120) and
implemented (labeling). When the law was repealed (postlabel), the sales of both organic and
non-GMO foods declined when compared to the labeling period. Specifically, the sales of
organic products rose by 1%, 3% and declined by 2% when the law was passed, implemented,
and repealed compared to the immediate previous periods. Similarly, the sales of non-GMO
increased by 2% and 0% and declined by 6% compared to the same periods. The implementation
of labeling led to a 6% decrease in the sales of GE Campbell’s soup while the repeal of the law
did not reverse the decline in sales. While here I am reporting the sequential impacts of policy
changes (i.e., relative to the immediate previous period) without adding controls, I also report all
impacts relative to the pre-period and sequential impacts adding controls in the Results chapter.
Table 4.1 also shows the impact of Vermont the Act 120 on product prices. Following a
DiD approach to compare the means in prices in treatment against control states, I find that the
passage, implementation, and repeal of Act 120 lead to $0.14 decrease, $0.07 increase, and $0.03
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increase in the prices of organic products compared to the immediate previous periods. NonGMO products see a price drop of $0.37 and $0.16 along with an increase of $0.02 in the same
time frame. The prices of GE soup jump by $0.05 and $0.11 following the implementation and
repeal of Vermont Act 120 compared to the immediate previous periods. Given that the prices
fluctuate over the study period; it is important to control for prices when analyzing the impact of
Vermont Act 120.
I also observe that the number of unique organic and non-GMO products decreases in the
labeling periods compared to other times while the number of products in GE Campbell’s soup
stay fairly consistent. When conducting robustness tests, I control for the number of unique
UPCs sold in the store to isolate the effect of availability of products on sales.
Similarity of treated and untreated stores
For a formal DiD strategy to be appropriate, the control and treatment groups must
demonstrate similar parallel trends in the pre-period.4 In Table 4.2, I display a few variables that
are possible determinants of demand. As mentioned above, Washington and Oregon were
selected as control states due to their demographic and cultural similarities to Vermont while not
being located close by or in the same media markets. When there are systematic differences in
consumer demand between food treated and untreated stores, it is important to control for those
variables that affect consumer demand and exploit the panel structure of the data. Through
utilizing the panel data, I control for time fixed effects, i.e. including week of year and yearquarter fixed effects to control for seasonality and national temporal shocks to sales. In addition,

4

Although we analyze the sequential impacts as well as impacts relative to the pre-period, our parallel trends
assumption only need to be satisfied in the pre-period because pre-period is the baseline without any policy
interventions; sequential impacts are presented only to illustrate the changes in sales over time for better comparison
reasons.
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I include product-store fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant product-store
characteristics.
Table 4.2 contains summary data for all three product categories between control and
treated stores during the pre-period. As the GE soup study time frame is shorter, its pre-period is
from when it would be reasonable that Campbell’s GE labels appeared on shelves to mandatory
labeling began, or from May 23 – June 26, 2016. As suggested by the statistically significant pvalues reported in Table 4.2, average log of quantities sold for organic, non-GMO and GE soup
in treated stores are significantly higher in treatment stores than control stores. The average price
of organic products in treated stores is significantly higher than that in control stores while nonGMO and GE-soup are on average cheaper in treated stores than control stores. The median
income in the zip code where an average treatment store is located is higher than that in control
stores. Treatment stores have higher shares of population with college degrees in their zip codes
than control stores.
As mentioned earlier, unit prices are included as a control variable in the difference-indifference (DiD) regression. To the extent that these differences are constant over time, store
fixed effects will control for all possible time-invariant determinants of demand for organic, nonGMO labeled products and GE Campbell’s soup, such as the possible observable differences.
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Table 4.2

Testing similiarities in treated and control stores in the “pre” period

Variables
Avg. (log(Q))
Avg. Unit Price ($)
Median Income ($)
Population with a
College Degree (%)

Control Stores
Organic
NonGMO
0.98
0.95
(0.89)
(0.86)
3.39
4.87
(2.31)
(4.09)
59105
(17933)
30.6
(13.44)

GE Soup
0.81
(0.80)
2.25
(0.67)
59687
(18107)
31.3
(13.85)

Treated Stores
Organic
NonGMO
1.14
1.10
(0.98)
(0.93)
3.71
4.55
(2.51)
(2.70)
54172
(11334)
36.6
(11.81)

GE
Soup
0.97
(0.83)
2.04
(0.68)
54394
(11200)
36.6
(11.96)

P-Value of Difference
Organic
NonGE
GMO
Soup
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000

0.000

0.0581

0.0393

0.0041

0.0107

Source: Income and education data from U.S. Census Bureau, 2012-2016 American Community Survey, 5-year estimates. Income and
education variables are based on the zip code where the store is located. The organic and non-GMO categories have the exact same
store mix.

30

Differences in differences estimation
Differences-in-differences (DiD) estimation is a form of reduced form econometrics and
is used to estimate a casual treatment effect under identifying assumptions believed and shown to
be reasonable. It is commonly used to measure the effects of treatments or interventions such as
policy changes, where a policy is implemented in only one of two similar, but not identical,
groups. The cornerstone of DiD lies in the parallel trends assumption. This assumption requires
that the two groups be on similar trajectories in the dependent variable prior to the policy change.
Then, DiD measures the treatment effect of the policy change by measuring the difference
between the projected counterfactual, based on the trajectory of the control group, and the
observed outcome of the treated group. In this study, the control group is made up of stores
located in Washington and Oregon, and the treated group are stores located in Vermont. The
policy changes are the passage of Vermont Act 120 on May 8, 2014, the implementation of GE
labeling on July 1, 2016, and the removal of mandatory GE labels in Vermont and signing of the
federal NBFDS on July 29, 2016. A simplified parallel trends graph is demonstrated in Figure
4.3, parallel trend graphs for each of the product categories in this study are demonstrated in
Figure 4.1and Figure 4.2.
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Outcome Variable
of Interest

Time

Control Group

Figure 4.3

Treated Group

Policy Change

Parallel trend assumption

Importantly, although the control and treatment groups are not identical, the DiD strategy
is able to isolate the effects of the policy change from other possible unobservable variables by
group fixed effects. The DiD estimator for Average Treatment Effect (ATE) is calculated as:

𝛿 = (𝑦11 − 𝑦10 ) − (𝑦21 − 𝑦201 )

(4.1)

where 𝛿 is the ATE, 𝑦𝑠𝑡 is the average number of units sold per upc-store-week given before and
after time period 𝑡 = {0,1} and state of the world, 𝑠 = 1 for the treated group and 𝑠 = 2 for the
control group.
Using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the DiD model, the
estimating equation is:
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𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡

(4.2)

where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the dependent variable for product i in store s at time period t, 𝛼 is a constant, 𝛿 is
the DiD parameter, 𝐷𝑠𝑡 a dummy variable equal to 1if the observation belongs to the treated
group (i.e., the store is located in Vermont) in the time period after a policy change took place,
𝛾𝑖𝑠 are product-store fixed effects, and 𝜏𝑡 are time fixed effects. Next, I discuss the specific
empirical specifications in this analysis.
Empirical Specifications
For the main analysis, I use an OLS regression to estimate a DiD model to find the effects
of various stages of mandatory labeling on the quantity of non-GMO, organic, and GE labeled
products sold. Individual products are identified by their universal product code (UPC), also
referred to as a barcode. The impact of mandatory labeling can be estimated using the following
regression model:

𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑠𝑤 = 𝛼𝑦−𝑞 + 𝛼𝑤 + 𝛼𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑖𝑤 + 𝛽2 𝐺𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑖𝑤 + 𝛽3 𝑡𝑖𝑤 + 𝛽4 𝐺𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑖𝑤 + 𝛽5 𝑟𝑖𝑤
+ 𝛽6 𝐺𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑖𝑤 + 𝛽7 𝑝𝑖𝑤 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑤

(4.3)

where ln𝑄𝑖𝑠𝑤 is the log of the product i’s quantity sold at store s in week w. The dummy
variables 𝛼𝑦−𝑞 denote year-by-quarter fixed effects, 𝛼𝑤 for week of year fixed effects, and 𝛼𝑖𝑠
for product-store fixed effects. As the study time frame is shorter for GE soup than for organic
and non-GMO foods, time fixed effects are not used in the analysis of GE soup. There are three
time dummy variables (𝑎𝑖𝑤 , 𝑡𝑖𝑤 , 𝑟𝑖𝑤 ) that represent the passage, implementation, and removal of
Vermont Act 120. I refer to the four periods that are separated by the three dummy variables as
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“Pre-Period”, “Act 120”, “Labeling”, and “Post-Label”, respectively. The dummy variable 𝐺𝑖𝑠 is
equal to one for products in Vermont. In regressions where product-store fixed effects are
included, Vermont as an individual variable drops out due to collinearity, as stores’ locations are
constant across time. The coefficient for 𝐺𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑖𝑤 is the estimated ATE of passing mandatory GE
labeling legislation, the coefficient for 𝐺𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑖𝑤 is the estimated ATE of implementing mandatory
GE labeling, and the coefficient for 𝐺𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑖𝑤 is the estimated ATE of mandatory labeling removal.
Lastly 𝑝𝑖𝑤 denotes unit price and 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑤 is the error term.
For all product groups under study, I use several distinct DiD specifications. By adding in
fixed effects individually, it shows the model’s sensitivity to different underlying assumptions.
Our preferred specification has the most controls, including product-store fixed effects, time
fixed effects, and unit price. Importantly, store-product fixed effects allow the demand for
individual products to vary by store based on unseen factors. Week of year fixed effects account
for seasonality and year-by-quarter fixed account for long-term trends in the regressions.
In addition to the main analysis’ specification presented above, I estimate models
allowing the treatment to have a different effect based on the demographics in stores’ locations. I
explore heterogeneity in income and education by modifying the specification demonstrated in
equation 4.3. Specifically, I use the median income (divided by 1,000) and the percentage of the
population with at least a bachelor’s degree in a store’s zip code. I then create a linear estimate of
how income and educational attainment affect the results by interacting a store’s income and
education levels with the treatment-time interaction terms.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
I first discuss the results from my main analysis; where I use the difference-in-differences
method to measure the average change in the quantity of each non-GMO and organic product
purchased, in response to when Act 120 passed in May of 2014, the mandatory labeling period in
July of 2016, and after labeling was overturned by the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure
Law. For GE Campbell’s Soup products, the same analysis is done focusing only on the response
to mandatory labeling and the post labeling periods. Next, I explore the heterogeneity of these
effects based on income and levels of education. I also use HomeScan data to analyze the
characteristics of Campbell’s soup buyers and compare their characteristics with consumers from
the rest of country to shed light on the generalizability of the results. I test the robustness of my
model specifications and rule out some alternative explanations for the findings. Finally, I use a
different empirical strategy, the synthetic control method, to check the veracity of my results.
Main analysis
Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 present the results from the difference-in-differences
specification for the non-GMO, organic, and GE Campbell Soup categories, respectively. The
dependent variable for each regression is the logged quantity of units sold per upc-store-week. In
all regressions, the coefficients on the interaction terms represent the estimated average treatment
effect on sales of Vermont Act 120 being passed (Act 120), implemented (Labeling), and
preempted (postlabel). The coefficients indicate the effect of each policy change relative to each
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category's pre-period, i.e. before Vermont Act 120 is passed in organic and non-GMO
regressions and roughly one month before the labeling period begins in GE Campbell’s soup
regressions. For all three categories, Column (1) has the least number of controls. In this
regression, the independent variables are a constant, time dummy variables representing the
different time periods, a dummy variable denoting treated stores (Vermont), and interactions of
the time and treated store variables (Act 120 * VT, Labeling * VT, and Postlabel * VT).
Columns (2) adds product-store fixed effects, controlling for time invariant demand
determinants of different products at each store. In regressions where product-store fixed effects
are included, Vermont as an individual variable drops out due to collinearity, as stores’ location
are constant across time. Column (3) for the non-GMO and organic categories adds two different
time fixed effects: week of year dummies and a rolling quarterly dummy to account for
seasonality and demand changes over time. As the study timeframe is much shorter for GE soup,
time fixed effects are not used in this category. The last column for all three product categories
adds a unit price variable and is the preferred specification because it has the most controls that
could account for unobserved differences in demand. Standard errors are robust to
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the product-store level.
Table 5.1 show the results for non-GMO products. When product-store and time fixed
effects are added gradually to the regression model, the signs of the results do not change
considerably. As mentioned above, model (4) in the last column with all fixed effects included
and unit prices added is our preferred specification. Unit price is negatively correlated with sales
of non-GMO products, supporting an inverse relationship between demand and prices. In sum,
the estimation results of model (4) show that the passage, implementation, and repeal of the
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Vermont Act 120 lead to a 3.5% decrease, 1.7% increase, and 2.7% decrease in the sales of nonGMO foods compared to before Vermont Act 120 was passed (pre-period).
I estimate the results for organic products in Table 5.2. It shows that the passage of
Vermont Act 120 leads to 0.8% increase in the sales of organic products, while the mandatory
labeling increases the sales of organic products further by 3.0%. Lastly, when Vermont Act 120
was preempted, the sales of organic products increase by 1.7% compared to before the law was
passed.
Lastly, the results for GE Campbell’s soup are shown in Table 5.3. I find that mandatory
labeling and removal of Vermont Act 120 leads to 5.4% and 4.5% decrease in sales of GE
Campbell’s soup compared to before the law takes effect (pre-period). Thus, mandatory GE
labeling seems to dampen consumers’ interests to buy GE Campbell’s soup. Although the
demand rises slightly after the law is repealed, it does not recover to the pre-period levels.
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Table 5.1

Difference-in-differences regression for log of quantity sold of non-GMO labeled
products

variables
Act 120 * VT
Labeling * VT
Postlabel * VT
Act 120
Labeling
Postlabel
Vermont

(1)
0.0110
(0.00810)
0.0222
(0.0119)
-0.0369**
(0.0113)
-0.0556***
(0.00482)
-0.105***
(0.00721)
-0.0635***
(0.00665)
0.152***
(0.0135)

(2)
-0.0272***
(0.00569)
0.0361***
(0.00861)
-0.0164*
(0.00739)
0.00301
(0.00349)
-0.0360***
(0.00514)
-0.000410
(0.00437)

0.950***
(0.00764)
No
No
3,789,234
0.007
65,149

0.957***
(0.00255)
Yes
No
3,789,234
0.000
65,149

(3)
-0.0270***
(0.00569)
0.0367***
(0.00861)
-0.0156*
(0.00740)
0.0444***
(0.00562)
0.0193**
(0.00746)
0.0693***
(0.00823)

(4)
-0.0354***
(0.00548)
0.0166*
(0.00829)
-0.0268***
(0.00721)
0.0407***
(0.00545)
0.0247***
(0.00726)
0.0712***
(0.00801)

0.855***
(0.00868)
Yes
Yes
3,789,234
0.002
65,149

-0.202***
(0.00245)
1.803***
(0.0144)
Yes
Yes
3,789,234
0.045
65,149

Unit Price
Constant

Product-Store FE
Time FE
Observations
R2
Number of
upc_store
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The pre-period is Dec. 31, 2012 - April 27,
2014, the Act 120 period is May 5, 2014 – June 26, 2016, the labeling period is July 4 – July 31,
2016, and the postlabel period is August 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2017. Weeks split by policy
implementation are dropped. Asterisks indicate: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 5.2

Difference-in-differences regression for log of quantity sold of organic labeled
products

variables
Act 120 * VT
Labeling * VT
Post Label * VT
Act 120
Labeling
Post Label
Vermont

(1)
0.0176***
(0.00414)
0.0366***
(0.00659)
0.00941
(0.00577)
-0.0463***
(0.00260)
-0.0774***
(0.00400)
-0.0652***
(0.00353)
0.163***
(0.00611)

(2)
0.00440
(0.00283)
0.0213***
(0.00458)
0.00551
(0.00379)
-0.0294***
(0.00197)
-0.0538***
(0.00285)
-0.0252***
(0.00247)

0.980***
(0.00349)
No
No
13,291,820
0.010
215,277

1.027***
(0.00118)
Yes
No
13,291,820
0.000
215,277

(3)
0.00456
(0.00283)
0.0214***
(0.00458)
0.00590
(0.00379)
0.0163***
(0.00267)
0.00679
(0.00382)
0.0419***
(0.00422)

(4)
0.00770**
(0.00280)
0.0301***
(0.00452)
0.0169***
(0.00378)
0.0143***
(0.00263)
0.00417
(0.00376)
0.0342***
(0.00417)

0.933***
(0.00483)
Yes
Yes
13,291,820
0.001
215,277

-0.221***
(0.00169)
1.769***
(0.00796)
Yes
Yes
13,291,820
0.030
215,277

Unit Price
Constant

Product-Store FE
Time FE
Observations
R2
Number of
upc_store
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The pre-period is Dec. 31, 2012 - April 27,
2014, the Act 120 period is May 5, 2014 – June 26, 2016, the labeling period is July 4 – July 31,
2016, and the postlabel period is August 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2017. Weeks split by policy
implementation are dropped. Asterisks indicate: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 5.3

Difference-in-differences regression of log of quantity sold of GE Campbell’s
Soup

variables
Labeling * VT
Post Label * VT
Labeling
Post Label
Vermont

(1)
-0.0677***
(0.00840)
-0.136***
(0.00804)
0.0262***
(0.00504)
0.206***
(0.00492)
0.165***
(0.0112)

(2)
-0.0874***
(0.00780)
-0.131***
(0.00750)
0.0183***
(0.00455)
0.221***
(0.00438)

(3)
-0.0538***
(0.00776)
-0.0449***
(0.00737)
-0.000184
(0.00451)
0.142***
(0.00427)

0.809***
(0.00673)
No
196,821
0.013
23,509

0.873***
(0.00259)
Yes
196,821
0.027
23,509

-0.515***
(0.00784)
2.030***
(0.0172)
Yes
196,821
0.072
23,509

Unit Price
Constant

Product-Store FE
Observations
R2
Number of
upc_store
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The pre-period May 23 – June 26, 2016, the
labeling period is July 4 – July 31, 2016, and the post-label period is August 1 – Sept. 11, 2016.
Weeks split by policy implementation are dropped. Asterisks indicate: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <
0.001.

The regression results reported in Table 5.1-5.3 compare the effect of each treatment to
the baseline established in the pre-period, i.e. before Vermont Act 120 is passed in organic and
non-GMO regressions and before the labeling period begins in GE Campbell’s soup. Table 5.4
shows the average treatment effects of each policy change on sales, relative to the preceding
period. As this analysis exists on a multi-year time frame for the non-GMO and organic
categories, comparing between time periods can help to understand the effects of mandatory GE
labeling. I summarize the sequential impact of policy changes on the sales of non-GMO, organic
and GE soup in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4

Comparing average treatment effects relative to the preceding time period
Changes in sales in
VT after Act 120 is
signed
-3.5%***
0.77%**

Changes in sales in Changes in sales in
VT during
VT after mandatory
mandatory labeling
labeling law lifted
Non-GMO Labeled Foods
5.2%*
-4.3%*
Organic Labeled Foods
2.4%*
-1.3%*
GE Labeled Soup
-5.4%***
+0.9%
Note: The pre-period, Act 120, labeling and postlabel period correspond to Dec. 31, 2012-April
27, 2014, May 5, 2014 – June 26, 2016, July 4 – July 31, 2016 and August 1, 2016 – Dec. 31,
2017 for the non-GMO and organic categories, respectively. For GE Campbell’s® Soup, the
pre-period, labeling and postlabel periods are May 23 – June 26, 2016, July 4 – July 31, 2016
and August 1 – Sept. 11, 2016. Weeks split by policy implementation are dropped. Asterisks
indicate: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
In Table 5.4, I show that after Vermont Act 120 is signed, the sales of non-GMO
products decrease by 3.5%, while mandatory labeling increases the sales of non-GMO products
by 5.2% compared to the preceding period (after Vermont Act 120 is signed). The sales of nonGMO products decline by 4.3% after the law is removed, that is, compared to the preceding
period (Labeling period). The impact on organic foods exhibit a similar pattern as non-GMO
products except that the signing of Vermont Act 120 increases the demand for organic products
by 0.77%. GE Campbell’s soup sees a 5.4% drop in its sales because of mandatory labeling and
its sales increase slightly by 0.9% after the law is repealed compared to the mandatory labeling
period.
I also investigate the effects of mandatory labeling on prices in Table 5.5. All variables as
in the last column of Table 5.1-5.3 are included: product-store fixed effects for time-invariant
product-store level demand differences and time fixed are incorporated to control for long-term
trends and seasonality. I find that the passage, implementation, and repeal of Vermont Act 120
leads to 0.4% increase, 1.1% decrease and an insignificant increase of 0.3% in the prices of nonorganic products. Compared to the 3.5% decrease, 1.7% increase and 2.7% decrease in quantities
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sold for non-GMO products, the changes in prices induced by the law are much smaller. In
contrast, the changes result from Vermont Act 120 for prices of organic products are much
larger: the passage, implementation and removal of the law increases the prices by 1.3%, 2.8%
and 2.7% respectively. The prices for GE soup rise even further as Vermont Act 120 takes effect
and is removed; the prices of GE soup jump by 4.9% and 10.4% in the respective periods
compared to the baseline period before the mandatory labeling takes effect. These results
highlight the importance of including prices as control variables in the sales regressions to isolate
the impact of prices in determining demand.
Table 5.5

Price regressions

Act 120 * VT
Labeling * VT
Post Label * VT
Act 120
Labeling
Post Label
Constant
Product-Store FE
Time FE
Observations
R2
Number of upc_stores

(1)
Log Unit Price
of Non-GMO
0.00390*
(0.00163)
-0.0113***
(0.00241)
0.00330
(0.00213)
-0.00966***
(0.00140)
-0.000921
(0.00190)
-0.00243
(0.00203)
1.349***
(0.00208)
Yes
Yes
3,789,234
0.006
65,149

(2)
Log Unit Price of
Organic
0.0128***
(0.000795)
0.0276***
(0.00122)
0.0274***
(0.00112)
-0.00419***
(0.000578)
-0.0109***
(0.000927)
-0.0127***
(0.000957)
1.168***
(0.00106)
Yes
Yes
13,291,820
0.006
215,277

(3)
Log Unit Price of GE
Labeled Soup
0.0491***
(0.00269)
0.104***
(0.00295)
-0.0191***
(0.000807)
-0.0811***
(0.00114)
0.736***
(0.000710)
Yes
No
196,821
0.033
23,509

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The pre-period, Act 120, labeling and postlabel period correspond
to Dec. 31, 2012-April 27, 2014, May 5, 2014 – June 26, 2016, July 4 – July 31, 2016 and August 1, 2016 – Dec. 31,
2017 for the non-GMO and organic categories, respectively. For GE Campbell’s® Soup, the pre-period, labeling
and postlabel periods are May 23 – June 26, 2016, July 4 – July 31, 2016 and August 1 – Sept. 11, 2016. Weeks split
by policy implementation are dropped. Asterisks indicate: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Investigating Heterogeneity
Next, I explore the heterogeneous impact of the different phases of Vermont Act 120 on
the sales of all product categories. Figures 5.1-5.3 show the treatment effects of passage,
labeling, and post-labeling on the sales of non-GMO, organic products, and labeling and postlabeling on GE Campbell’s soup by income quintiles and education. Here the income and
education levels are obtained for the zip codes where stores are located. Education levels are
measured by the percent of adult population with a bachelor’s degree while the income variable
captures the median household income in the store’s zip code. Both variables come from the
2012-2016 American Community Survey. I present full regression results including interaction
terms between median income and education attainment with treatment x time dummies in
Appendix Table A1 and illustrate the regression results in Figures 5.1-5.3.
Figures 5.1 to Figure 5.3 show the heterogeneous impacts of Vermont Act 120, labeling
and postlabel on the sales of non-GMO, organic and GE Campbell’s soup across eight incomeeducation groups. Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals are included. There are four
income groups in two education categories, i.e. lower and higher education group. The lower
education group includes stores located in ZIP codes in the 25th percentile of the education
levels in Vermont, where 23.3% of the ZIP code’s adult population have a bachelor’s degree.
The higher education group includes stores located in ZIP codes at the 75th percentile, where
41.4% of adult population have a bachelor’s degree. The four income groups are ZIP codes at the
1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quintile of the income distribution in Vermont and have median income of
$46,166, $52,308, $58,214, $66,944, respectively. As mentioned above, after running the
regression tables interacting income and education levels with treatment times time dummies, I
can do a back-of-envelop calculation of how the impact varies with different income and
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education attainment. In this sense, Figure 5.1-5.3 illustrate the heterogenous impact on stores
located in Zip codes at 25th (lower education group) and 75th percentile of education levels
(higher education group) and at 1st through 4th income quintiles.
I find that places with higher education levels see a much smaller impact of mandatory
labeling on the sales of non-GMO and organic products than those with lower education levels
(Figure 5.1 and 5.2). It is possible that people with higher education levels have a better
understanding of non-GMO/organic products and GE technologies (Kolodinsky and Reynolds
2014). Figure 5.1 shows how different stages of Vermont Act 120 affects the sales of non-GMO
products between lower education areas and higher education areas. Within the same education
category, the positive impact of mandatory labeling on sales increases with income, potentially
due to affordability or different preferences. Similarly, I find that mandatory labeling has a
bigger positive impact on organic products in lower education areas than higher education places
(Figure 5.2). Within the same education category, the increase in sales due to mandatory labeling
also rises with income, which may result from affordability or heterogeneous preferences.
Figure 5.3 shows how the impact of different stages of Vermont Act 120 on the sales of
GE soup varies across income and education levels. In the lower education areas, the negative
impact of mandatory labeling on GE soup sales decrease as income rises. In contrast, the
negative impact of mandatory labeling on sales is relatively constant across income groups for
higher-education areas. Overall, higher-education groups see a smaller negative impact on GE
soup due to mandatory labeling, again suggesting that people with better education have more
knowledge of GE technologies (Kolodinsky and Reynolds 2014). But the rebound of sales when
mandatory labeling is repealed is also smaller in the higher-education group, suggesting a more
stable preference even when the law is removed for those places.
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Figure 5.1

The impact of Act 120 on quantities sold of non-GMO products across income and
education distributions in Vermont

Figure 5.2

The impact of Act 120 on quantities sold of organic products across education and
income distributions in Vermont
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Figure 5.3

The impact of Act 120 on quantities sold of GE Campbell’s Soup across education
and income distributions in Vermont

46

External Validity
As I am using GE Campbell’s soup as an example of GE products that followed labeling
requirements, I explore the generalizability of my results using HomeScan data to analyze the
characteristics of GE Campbell’s Soup buyers in Vermont and compare their characteristics with
average consumers in the U.S. HomeScan is a data product derived from the Consumer Network
household data from the National Consumer Panel, a joint project between IRI and Nielsen. I
specifically use the MedProfiler subset, which includes additional health and medical
information from a subsample of households. In addition to the household’s demographic and
health information, the dataset provides the weekly transaction data itemized at the UPC level for
each household. I only use households from the static panel, which is weighted to be
representative of the full U.S. population. In this analysis, I compare GE Campbell’s Soup
buyers to non-buyers in both the United States and Vermont using logit regressions. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable for if a household purchased a GE Campbell’s soup
product in 2016, with a soup-buyer equal to one and a non-soup-buyer equal to zero. 70.1% of
Vermonters in the dataset are soup-buyers, while 68.1% of households in the United States as a
whole are soup-buyers. Results are presented in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6

Comparing soup-buyers to non-soup buyers in Vermont and nationally

Children in HH
Married
Income
White, non-Hispanic

(1)
U.S.
0.193***
(0.0341)
0.488***
(0.0280)
-0.000000727
(0.000000384)
0.383***
(0.0746)
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(2)
Vermont
-2.723*
(1.127)
2.384*
(1.085)
-0.00000549
(0.0000121)
1.072
(1.707)

Table 5.6 (continued)
(1)
(2)
-0.0342
0
(0.0824)
(.)
Asian, non-Hispanic
-0.361***
0
(0.0988)
(.)
Hispanic
-0.119
0
(0.0885)
(.)
Education
-0.324***
1.039
(0.0287)
(0.926)
Obese
0.127***
2.113*
(0.0254)
(0.852)
***
Type II Diabetes
0.137
-1.183
(0.0357)
(1.194)
High Cholesterol
0.0954***
0.114
(0.0271)
(0.941)
High Blood Pressure
0.158***
0.699
(0.0276)
(0.911)
Heartburn
0.176***
-2.168*
(0.0258)
(0.977)
Very concerned about GMO’s
-0.125**
-3.366**
(0.0387)
(1.217)
Somewhat concerned about GMO’s
-0.000922
0.790
(0.0325)
(0.899)
Somewhat or very concerned about rBST
-0.0621*
0.824
in dairy products
(0.0309)
(0.911)
Somewhat or very concerned about
0.0193
0.133
antibiotics in meat
(0.0354)
(0.991)
Follows an organic or non-gmo diet
-0.687***
-2.397
(0.0466)
(1.586)
Describes health status as excellent or very
0.0654*
-0.250
good
(0.0331)
(0.955)
Exercise most days or sometimes
0.0245
0.236
(0.0344)
(1.282)
Constant
0.108
-0.831
(0.0866)
(2.353)
N
33,920
85
Pseudo R2
0.0429
0.3629
LR Chi2(20)
1821.2
36.71
Prob > chi2
0.0000
0.0037
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable for if a household purchases GE Campbell’s
soup in 2016 (soup buyer = 1). For all variables regarding heath or diet concerns, a dummy
variable of 1 indicates that at least one individual in the household has the ailment or agrees with
the statement. Observations are at the household level. Asterisks indicate: * p < 0.05, ** p <
0.01, *** p < 0.001
Black, non-Hispanic
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Most household characteristics are not significant when comparing Vermont soup-buyers
and non-soup-buyers. For the characteristics that show significance in both U.S. households and
Vermont households, having the head of household be married or at least one obese household
member is positively associated with being a soup buyer, and having at least one family member
be “Very concerned about GMOs” is negatively associated with being a soup buyer. One of the
most important findings from these results, is that a household is much less likely to purchase
GE Campbell’s Soup if they are “very” concerned about GMOs. This indicates that people who
were wary of GMOs, may already avoid purchasing GE Campbell’s Soup products in the half-ayear leading up to mandatory labeling going into effect on July 1st. Thus, the reduction of sales
of GE soup products during labeling was likely driven by people who were not as concerned or
not concerned at all about GMOs to begin with. In all, 23.9% of households nationally and
19.7% of households in Vermont indicated they were very concerned about GMOs.
Robustness Tests
In addition to the previous analyses, I conduct several robustness tests. First, I add a UPC
count variable to each regression from the main analysis. The UPC count variable is the number
of unique UPCs sold in one store in one week and attempts to control for the differing number of
products available in each category over time. Results are consistent and presented in the
appendix in Table A.2. I acknowledge that the number of UPCs sold may not represent the
number of UPCs available in a store-week. The next robustness test aims to control for the
availability issue by limiting the UPCs used in the analysis to UPCs that appear in each state in
every week of the analysis. The results are presented in Table A.3. The conclusions remain
largely consistent. Thirdly, I test the GE Campbell’s Soup regression to account for average
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weekly temperature in a store’s zip code, presented in table A.4. The results in the robustness
tests remain consistent with my main results.
Synthetic control method
In this section, I use synthetic control methods to see if my results change substantially.
Although Washington and Oregon show largely parallel pre-existing trends as Vermont, both
states are quite different from Vermont in several other ways: for example, Washington and
Oregon are much larger and more racially diverse than Vermont. In addition, Table 4.2 shows
that the average income and education levels in zip codes around treated and control stores are
significantly different. If we assume average income, education levels, population and racial
distributions are largely time-invariant, then store fixed effects can account for those differences
between treated and control stores. Alternatively, I use the synthetic control method (Abadie,
Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010; 2015) to relax this assumption and test the robustness of my
results. The synthetic control approach creates a control group based on the pre-labeling sales
volume data and estimates the effect of the GE labeling law by measuring the difference in
volume sold of the product categories of interest and the synthetic control group. The synthetic
control method can construct close pre-treatment trends between the treatment and control group.
As synthetic control method is best applied to aggregate-level data, I use aggregate
grocery-store level sales across 4-week time periods for the organic and non-GMO product
category instead of the upc-store-week approach used in my main analysis. As the time frame for
the GE soup category is only four months instead of four years, an observation is the aggregate
sales of GE soup per store-week. The synthetic control method also only allows for one treated
group. Therefore, I create a composite Vermont grocery store, consisting of the average total
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volume sold per 4-week period of 52 grocery stores in the state for the organic and non-GMO
categories, and per one-week period of 54 grocery stores for GE soup.
For the potential donor pool (candidate comparison stores), I include all grocery stores
from Washington, Oregon, and Northeastern states with sales of the respective product
categories in every period. This results in a potential donor pool of 1,106 stores in the organic
and non-GMO categories, and 1,225 stores for GE soups. Stores located within Vermont’s
dominant T.V. market, the Burlington-Plattsburgh Designated Marketing Area (DMA), are
excluded because of potential spillover effects of Vermont Act 120 from media coverage. I
choose candidate stores that minimize the Root of Mean Squared Prediction Error (RMSPE) for
pre-trends in sales. For the organic and GE soup labeled categories, the comparison stores consist
of 126 and 73 total stores respectively from Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington. For the non-GMO labeled category, the
comparison stores consist of 195 stores from the same states as the organic and GE soup
categories, with the addition of Oregon.
Mathematically, let us denote the total volume sales in ounces of the composite Vermont
stores as 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 (𝑗 = 2, 3, … , 𝑛). A set of weights, 𝑤𝑗 (𝑗 = 2, 3, … , 𝑛) are assigned to create a
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑡ℎ

synthetic control group 𝑌𝑡

2

𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑡ℎ
= ∑𝑛𝑗=2 𝑤𝑗 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 so that, ∑𝑥𝑡=1(𝑌1,𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡
) is minimized. The

time period, x, is 18 four-week long time periods for the organic and non-GMO categories, and 7
weeklong time periods for the GE soup category.
The optimal set of weights are calculated using the Stata “synth” package. For the nonGMO synthetic control group, weights ranged from 0.004 - 0.01 with the highest weight
assigned to a grocery store in Springfield, OR. The organic product category’s synthetic control
weights ranged from 0 - 0.01, with the highest weight assigned to a grocery stores in New Haven
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and Torrington, CT, and Raritan, NJ. The GE soup product category’s synthetic control weights
range from 0.008 - 0.295, with the highest weight assigned to a grocery store in Great
Barrington, MA.
Figure 5.4 shows the total sales volume in ounces of non-GMO and organic products sold
in Vermont and its synthetic control per 4-week period, from 2013 to 2017. While the volume of
non-GMO labeled products sold rose steadily over the four-year period, the volume of organic
products sold was more volatile. Figure 5.5 shows the total sales volume for GE Soup from May
23 – Sept. 18, 2016. Sales for soup remained fairly flat during this period, then spike
dramatically in September. When looking at long term soup sales, a similar spike occurs
annually in mid-September. This annual spike may be due to the transition from summer to fall
or correspond with September as Feeding America’s Hunger Action Month. I calculate the
impacts of mandatory GE labeling during three distinct time periods, after Vermont Act 120 is
passed but before labeling, during labeling, and after labeling is removed, by taking the average
difference between the Vermont composite store and synthetic control over each period.
I find that the passage, implementation, and repeal of Vermont Act 120 leads to 0.18%
decrease, 5.44% and 1.41% increases in the sales of organic products compared to the baseline
periods before the law is passed (Table 5.7). Similarly, the sales of non-GMO products increase
by 0.88% when the mandatory labeling is in effect and drop when the law is repealed but not
quite to the baseline levels. Lastly, the mandatory labeling decreases the sales of GE soup by
3.16%. Its sales rebound when the law is repealed and only decrease by 0.16% compared to
baseline levels at the end of the study period.
In sum, although the magnitude of the estimated impacts of various stages of the policy
are smaller, the signs of the estimates from the synthetic control method are largely consistent
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with my main DiD results. The exceptions are the effects of Vermont Act 120's passage. Using
DiD, I find that the act's passage leads to a decrease in sales of non-GMOs and an increase in
sales of organics (Tables 5.1 and 5.2). Using Synthetic Control, I find that the act's passage leads
to an increase in sales of non-GMOs and a decrease in sales of organics (Table 5.7).
Table 5.7

Synthetic control estimates of average treatment effects of GE labeling policy
changes on food sales

Organic
Non-GMO
GE Soups
Act 120
-373.36
-0.18%
125.79
0.32%
Labeling
11,643.03
5.44%
382.89
0.88%
-170.80
-3.16%
Post Labeling
2,994.38
1.41%
-451.37
-0.91%
-6.46
-0.16%
Note: The outcome variable is in ounces sold per store. Percentages are calculated using the
Vermont composite store’s average sales volume per product category over a 4-week period for
each individual period. The pre-period, Act 120, labeling and postlabel period correspond to
January 2013-April 27, 2014, May 5, 2014 – June 26, 2016, July 4 – July 31, 2016 and August 1,
2016 – Dec. 31, 2017 for the non-GMO and organic categories, respectively. For GE Campbell’s
Soup, the pre-period, labeling and postlabel periods are May 23 – June 26, 2016, July 4 – July
31, 2016 and August 1 – Sept. 11, 2016
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Figure 5.4

Aggregate volume sold for organic and non-GMO foods per grocery store per
4-week period

54

Figure 5.5

Aggregate volume sold for GE Campbell’s Soup per grocery store per week
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
My thesis measures the consumer purchasing responses of the implementation of
mandatory GE labeling and the associated increase in consumer awareness of it on non-GMO,
organic, and GE labeled foods using a panel of product-store level scanner data and Vermont Act
120. My estimations show that each food product category was affected differently by the
passage, implementation, and overturn of the law. After Vermont Act 120 was passed, sales of
non-GMO foods decreased by 3.5% and sales of organics increased slightly by about 0.8%
compared to before the law was passed. Importantly, both non-GMO and organic labeled foods,
which can be viewed as “safe” alternatives for people seeking to avoid GE ingredients in their
food, saw increases in quantity sold in Vermont during labeling, of 5.2% and 2.4%, respectively
when compared to the preceding period (after Vermont Act 120 is signed). Meanwhile, GE
labeled soup saw sales decline by 5.4% when compared to that analysis' preceding period (when
labeling was not yet mandatory). After mandatory labeling in Vermont was preempted by the
NBFDS, non-GMO and organic products decrease from their increased sales during labeling, by
-4.3% and -1.3%, and GE labeled soup rebounds slightly by 0.9% but statistically insignificantly.
My primary robustness check utilizes the synthetic control method to compare aggregate
monthly, for non-GMO and organic foods, and weekly, for GE Campbell’s soup, sales volumes
at the grocery-store level. It confirms that during labeling non-GMO and organic labeled goods
saw heightened sales and GE soups saw diminished sales. However, the effect estimates using
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synthetic control were mostly smaller in magnitude than the main DiD analysis and the signs of
the effects of Vermont Act 120's passage in particular are reversed. Using DiD, I find that the
act's passage leads to a decrease in sales of non-GMOs and an increase in sales of organics, while
using synthetic control, I find that the act's passage leads to an increase in sales of non-GMOs
and a decrease in sales of organics. Given the inconsistency of estimated impacts of law passage
on sales, the true impact of passage of Vermont Act 120 may be noisy. In contrast, the
implementation and repeal of Vermont Act 120 gives a more robust estimate of impacts on sales.
Not all consumers react alike to mandatory GE labels. For all three product categories,
areas with lower levels of education are more responsive to labeling than areas with higher levels
of education. As more educated people are more likely to be aware of GE technologies
(Kolodinsky and Reynolds 2014), their lower response rates may be due to having already
formed an opinion on GE foods prior to the Vermont labeling law.
Although Vermont is not representative of the United States demographically and
politically as a whole and there were many complications in the roll out of labeling, it is the only
place that has seen mandatory GE labeling to date. As the National Bioengineered Food
Disclosure Standard goes into effect, and will be fully enforced by Jan. 1, 2022, this research can
inform policymakers and the food industry what to expect from the consumers. My conclusion
that mandatory labeling did affect the sales of non-GMO, organic, and GE labeled products
differs from a previous study on consumer purchasing effects to mandatory GE labeling, which
found no significant changes (Pazuniak 2018). Additionally, while survey studies find the law
led to a reduction in opposition to GE foods (Kolodinsky and Lusk 2018), this was not reflected
in consumer purchasing behavior during labeling implementation. Instead, during labeling they
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purchased GE alternatives, non-GMO and organic labeled products, and reduced purchases of
GE labeled soup.
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APPENDIX A
ROBUSTNESS TEST
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Table A.1

Difference-in-differences regression for log of quantity sold including income and
education variables

variables

Non-GMO

Organic

Inc*Edu*Act 120*VT

0.0000300
(0.0000321)
0.00000293
(0.0000492)
-0.0000855*
(0.0000428)
-0.000463
(0.00145)
0.00114
(0.00217)
0.00491*
(0.00193)
-0.00270
(0.00182)
-0.00160
(0.00280)
0.00370
(0.00241)
0.0283
(0.0770)
0.00886
(0.116)
-0.252*
(0.102)
0.0405***
(0.00545)
0.0245***
(0.00725)
0.0709***
(0.00801)
-0.202***
(0.00245)
1.803***
(0.0144)
Yes
Yes
3,789,234
0.045
65,149

0.00000375
(0.0000149)
-0.0000157
(0.0000259)
-0.0000541**
(0.0000209)
0.000327
(0.000660)
0.00130
(0.00113)
0.00263**
(0.000917)
-0.00276**
(0.000860)
-0.00371*
(0.00151)
0.000131
(0.00121)
0.0885*
(0.0356)
0.136*
(0.0616)
-0.0133
(0.0496)
0.0139***
(0.00263)
0.00367***
(0.00376)
0.0336***
(0.00417)
-0.221***
(0.00169)
1.769***
(0.00795)
Yes
Yes
13,291,820
0.030
215,277

Inc*Edu*Labeling*VT
Inc*Edu*Post Label*VT
Income*Act 120*VT
Income*Labeling*VT
Income*Post Label*VT
Education*Act 120*VT
Education*Labeling*VT
Education*Post Label*VT
Act 120 * VT
Labeling * VT
Post Label * VT
Act 120
Labeling
Post Label
Unit Price
Constant
Product-Store FE
Time FE
Observations
R2
Number of upc_store
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GE Campbell’s
Soup
-0.000101*
(0.0000504)
-0.0000563
(0.0000488)
0.00427*
(0.00217)
0.00134
(0.00213)
0.00607*
(0.00292)
0.00196
(0.00282)
-0.300*
(0.117)
-0.0731
(0.114)
-0.000177
(0.00451)
0.142***
(0.00427)
-0.515***
(0.00784)
1.985***
(0.0172)
Yes
No
196,821
0.072
23,509

Table A.1 (continued)
Note: The income variable is median household income by zip code, per $1,000. The education
variable is percentage of the adult population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Income and
education data are from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2012-2016 American Community Survey, 5year estimates. Asterisks indicate: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table A.2

Difference-in-differences regression for log of quantity sold with the addition of a
UPC count variable

variables
Act 120 * VT
Labeling * VT
Post Label * VT
Act 120
Labeling
Post Label
Unit Price
UPC Count
Constant

Non-GMO

Organic

-0.0347***
(0.00549)
0.0106
(0.00832)
-0.0406***
(0.00725)
0.0410***
(0.00545)
0.0246***
(0.00726)
0.0710***
(0.00801)
-0.202***
(0.00245)
0.000912***
(0.000599)
1.651***
(0.0171)
Yes
Yes
3,789,234
0.046
65,149

0.0579***
(0.00280)
0.119***
(0.00454)
0.117***
(0.00384)
-0.00888***
(0.00264)
-0.0355***
(0.00378)
-0.0184***
(0.00420)
-0.221***
(0.00168)
0.000951***
(0.0000151)
1.378***
(0.0101)
Yes
Yes
13,291,820
0.032
215,277

GE Campbell’s
Soup
-0.00859
(0.00782)
-0.0131
(0.00738)
-0.00118
(0.00451)
0.0793***
(0.00444)
0.00833***
(0.000179)
1.230***
0.0230)
Yes
No
196,821
0.085
23,509

Product-Store FE
Time FE
Observations
R2
Number of
upc_store
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The pre-period is January 2013 through April
27, 2014, the Act 120 period is May 5, 2014 – June 26, 2016, the labeling period is July 4 – July
31, 2016, and the postlabel period is August 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2017. Weeks split by policy
implementation are dropped. Asterisks indicate: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table A.3

Difference-in-differences regression for log of quantity, only including products
sold in each state in every week

variables

Non-GMO

Organic

Act 120 * VT

-0.0541***
(0.00862)
0.0381*
(0.0149)
-0.0751***
(0.0125)
0.0451***
(0.00819)
0.0107
(0.0122)
0.0992***
(0.0141)
-0.241***
(0.00497)
2.167***
(0.0294)
Yes
Yes
1,140,486
0.072
7,372

-0.0165*
(0.00781)
0.0309*
(0.0137)
-0.0267*
(0.0107)
0.0492***
(0.00678)
0.0275**
(0.0104)
0.0876***
(0.0116)
-0.229***
(0.00489)
1.644***
(0.0215)
Yes
Yes
1,798,810
0.034
14,545

Labeling * VT
Post Label * VT
Act 120
Labeling
Post Label
Unit Price
Constant

GE Campbell’s
Soup
-0.0492***
(0.00824)
-0.0387***
(0.00780)
-0.00270
(0.00475)
0.143***
(0.00447)
-0.528***
(0.00823)
2.036***
(0.0178)
Yes
No
177,872
0.073

Product-Store FE
Time FE
Observations
R2
Number of
upc_store
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The pre-period is January 2013 through April
27, 2014, the Act 120 period is May 5, 2014 – June 26, 2016, the labeling period is July 4 – July
31, 2016, and the postlabel period is August 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2017. Weeks split by policy
implementation are dropped. Asterisks indicate: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table A.4

Difference-in-differences for log of quantity of GE Campbell’s Soup, including
temperature

variables
Labeling * VT
Post Label * VT
Labeling
Post Label
Vermont

(1)
-0.0677***
(0.00840)
-0.136***
(0.00804)
0.0262***
(0.00504)
0.206***
(0.00492)
0.165***
(0.0112)

(2)
-0.0874***
(0.00780)
-0.131***
(0.00750)
0.0183***
(0.00455)
0.221***
(0.00438)

Unit Price
Avg. Weekly
Temperature
Constant

0.809***
(0.00673)
No

0.873***
(0.00259)
Yes

(3)
-0.0538***
(0.00776)
-0.0449***
(0.00737)
-0.000184
(0.00451)
0.142***
(0.00427)

(4)
-0.0484***
(0.00776)
-0.0512***
(0.00737)
0.0547***
(0.00472)
0.180***
(0.00437)

-0.515***
(0.00784)

-0.498***
(0.00774)
-0.230***
(0.000591)
2.346***
(0.0195)
Yes

2.030***
(0.0172)
Yes

Product-Store
FE
Observations
196,821
196,821
196,821
196,821
2
R
0.013
0.027
0.072
0.08
Number of
23,509
23,509
23,509
23,509
upc_store
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The pre-period May 23 – June 26, 2016, the
labeling period is July 4 – July 31, 2016, and August 1 – Sept. 11, 2016.Weeks split by policy
implementation are dropped. Asterisks indicate: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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